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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
REFERENCES TOP ARTIES 
Appellant/Petitioner is Spanish Fork City (the "City"). Appellees/Respondents 
are Carole Marziale and James Marziale (the "Marziales"). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, OR RULES 
The following provisions are important to a proper resolution of this appeal: 
A. Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5 
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows: 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by 
this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The 
district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by 
statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be 
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
B. Utah Code§ 78A-5-102(1) 
Section 78A-5-102(1) of the Utah Code provides as follows: 
The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
C. Utah Code§ 78A-2-301(1)(dd) 
Section 78A-2-301(1)(dd) of the Utah Code provides as follows: 
( dd) Except as provided in this section, all fees collected under this section are 
paid to the General Fund. Except as provided in this section, all fees shall be paid 
at the time the clerk accepts the pleading for filing or performs the requested 
service. 
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D. Utah Code§ 78-2-302(2) 
Section 78-2-302(2) of the Utah Code provides as follows: 
(2) As provided in this chapter. any person may institute, prosecute, defend, and 
appeal any cause in any court in this state without prepayment of fees and costs or 
security, by taking and subscribing, before any officer authorized to administer an 
oath, an affidavit of impecuniosity demonstrating financial inability to pay fees 
and costs or give security. 
E. Utah R. Civ. P. 1 
Rule 1 ofthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
Scope of Rules. These rules govern the procedure in the courts of the state of 
Utah in all actions of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in 
all statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules promulgated by this 
court or statutes enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. They 
shall be liberally construed and applied to achieve the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action. These rules govern all actions brought 
after they take effect and all further proceedings in actions then pending. If, in the 
opinion of the court, applying a rule in an action pending when the rule takes 
effect would not be feasible or would be unjust, the former procedure applies. 
F. Utah R. Civ. P. 3 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a 
complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons together with a 
copy of the complaint, then the complaint, the summons and proof of 
service, must be filed within ten days of such service. If, in a case 
commenced under paragraph (a)(2) of this rule, the complaint, summons 
and proof of service are not filed within ten days of service, the action 
commenced shall be deemed dismissed and the court shall have no further 
jurisdiction thereof. If a check or other form of payment tendered as a filing 
fee is dishonored, the party shall pay the fee by cash or cashier's check 
within 10 days after notification by the court. Dishonor of a check or other 
form of payment does not affect the validity of the filing, but may be 
grounds for such sanctions as the court deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the action and the award of costs and attorney fees. 
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(b) Time of jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of 
filing of the complaint or service of the summons and a copy of the 
complaint. 
G. Utah R. Civ. P. S(e) (2013) 
Rule S(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (2013) provides as follows: 
(e) Filing with the court defined. A party may file with the clerk of court 
using any means of delivery permitted by the court. The court may require 
parties to file electronically with an electronic filing account. Filing is 
complete upon the earliest of acceptance by the electronic filing system, the 
clerk of court or the judge. The filing date shall be noted on the paper. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
A. Issue and Presentation in Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
I. The issue presented in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred in 
concluding that the Marziales' complaint was timely filed. See Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari filed by the City, pp. I, 10-11; See also, Order granting Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, entered November 8, 2016. 
B. Standard of Review. 
Review of the Court of Appeals' decision on certiorari is de novo. State v. Levin, 
2006 UT 50,~ 15, 144 P.3d 1096. Further, "application of a statute of limitations to bar 
an action presents a question of law that we review for correctness." Gillmor v. Summit 
County, 2010 UT 69, ~ 16, 246 P.3d 102. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Carole Marziale alleges that she was injured on July 11, 2011, when she stepped 
on a white PVC cap laying on the sidewalk at the Spanish Fork City Sports Complex and 
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fell. (R. 3-4.) James Marziale alleges a loss of consortium due to Carole Marziale's 
injuries. (R. 1.) The Marziales, through their attorney, filed a Notice of Claim required 
by Utah Code § 63G-7-40 1(2) with the Spanish Fork City Recorder on July 9, 2012. 
(R. 35.) The Notice of Claim was deemed denied 60 days thereafter, on September 7, 
2012. (R. 34.) On August 2, 2013, the Marziales' complaint was submitted twice for 
filing, but was rejected both times. (R. 332C.) Thirty-nine days later, on September 10, 
2013, the Marziales resubmitted their Complaint and it was accepted by the district court 
at that time. (R. 332C.) However, the complaint filed on September 10,2013 was 
beyond the statutory one-year period within which it was required to be filed under the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("GIA''). (R. 332C.) Because strict compliance with 
the notice and filing provisions of the GIA are jurisdictional, the trial court ruled that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action and dismissed the case with prejudice. 
(R. 332B.) On July 29, 2016, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Marziales' complaint 
was filed on August 2, 2013, the date the complaint was rejected by the district court. 
The Marziales' complaint, according to the Court of Appeals, was filed within the statute 
oflimitations because it was "received" by the electronic filing system on August 2, 2013 
and because nothing in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "permits a court clerk to reject 
a filing for lack of payment [of a filing fee]." Marziale v. Spanish Fork City, 2016 UT 
App 166, ~~ 17-18, __ P.3d __ .(citations omitted). The decision of the Court of 
Appeals is cited herein as "Opinion~ __ " and is attached as Addendum A. 
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B. Course of Pertinent Proceedings 
1. On December 11, 2013, the City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the ground that subject matter jurisdiction cannot exist over the Marziales' action because 
they failed to file their complaint within one year of their notice of claim being denied as 
required by Utah Code§ 63G-7-403(2)(b). (R. 22, 26.) 
2. On January 7, 2014, the Marziales filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment along with a Motion to Correct Record. (R. 
37, 50.) The Motion to Correct Record requested that the trial court change the date on 
which the Marziales filed their complaint from September 10, 2013 to August 2, 2013. 
(R. 37, 39-40.) The Affidavit of Mark T. Flickinger, the Marziales' attorney, along with 
the Affidavit ofBobbi Convery, legal assistant to the Marziales' attorney, were filed in 
support of their Motion to Correct Record and in opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by the City. (R. 70, 89.) 
3. On February 19, 2014, the City filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of 
its Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Correct 
Record (R. 185) along with the Declaration of Tracy Walker (R. 170), the eFiling System 
Administrator employed by the Utah State Office of the Courts. 
4. The Marziales filed their Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion to 
Correct Record on March 21, 2014. (R. 222.) 
5. On July 1, 2014, the district court, after hearing oral argument, granted the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the City and denied the Motion to Correct 
Record filed by the Marziales. (R. 332C- 332B.) 
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6. After granting the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Marziales objected 
to the proposed order submitted by the City and requested that the district court 
reconsider its ruling. (R. 272.) 
7. On September 23, 2014, the district court denied the Marziales' Motion to 
Reconsider and reinforced its ruling that the Marziales' complaint was untimely under the 
GIA by entering its Summary Judgment and Order stating such on September 24, 2014. 
(R. 332D-332B.) (Add. B). 
8. The district court held that the Marziales' complaint "was not filed within 
the applicable statute of limitations set forth by Utah Code § 630-7 -403(2)(b )" and that 
even though the Marziales "submitted a Complaint for filing through the electronic filing 
system twice on August 2, 2013 .... [t]hese submitted Complaints were not accepted by 
electronic filing system, the clerk of court, or a judge as required by Rule 5( e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore were not filed with the Court." (R. 332C.) 
stated: 
9. The Summary Judgment and Order entered on September 24, 2014 further 
Because the Court finds as a matter of law that the 
[Marziales '] Complaint was not filed within the applicable 
statute of limitations, there is no basis for the [Marziales'] 
Motion to Correct Record. Finally, rather than strike the 
Affidavit of Mark T. Flickinger, Affidavit ofBobbi Convery, 
or the Declaration of Tracy Walker, the Court considered 
them and all of the evidentiary objections thereto. However, 
the Court finds no admissible evidence from the affidavits or 
declaration that creates an issue of fact that would preclude 
the legal conclusion that the filing of the [Marziales '] legal 
action is untimely. 
(R. 332C-332B.) [Add. B). 
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10. On October 15, 2014, the Marziales filed a Notice of Appeal of the "Order 
Granting Defendant Spanish Fork City's Motion for Summary Judgment" entered on 
September 24, 2014. (R. 334.) 
11. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the Marziales filed their 
complaint on August 2, 2013 and within the applicable statute of limitations. Opinion, 
~ 19. While the Marziales submitted two separate Complaints for filing August 2, 2013-
one Complaint with the district court located in Spanish Fork City and the other with the 
district court located in Provo- the Court of Appeals only determined that the Provo 
complaint was timely filed and did not address the filing status of the same Complaint 
with the district court located in Spanish Fork City. Opinion,~ 10. 
12. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the Marziales' complaint was 
filed on August 2, 2013 and within the statute of limitations because it was "received" by 
the electronic filing system and because nothing in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
"permits a court clerk to reject a filing for lack of payment [of a filing fee]." Opinion~~ 
17-18. 
C. Facts Material to the Appeal 
1. The Marziales allege injury and damages as a result of Carole Marziale's 
fall on a sidewalk at the City Sports Complex on July 11, 2011. (R. 1-5.) 
2. The Marziales mailed a Notice of Claim along with a Certificate of Mail to 
the City Recorder on July 9, 2012. (R. 35.) 
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3. The Marziales' claim against the City was denied pursuant to Utah Code 
§ 63G-7-403(l)(b) on September 7, 2012. (R. 5, 18, 34.) 
4. The Marziales' attorney submitted a complaint to the eFiling system twice 
on August 2, 2013. Both of these submissions were rejected. Declaration ofTracy 
Walker ("Walker Decl."), ~~ 13-18. (R. 167-66.) 
5. All attorneys who seek to submit documents through the eFiling System 
must contract with an approved "service provider," an entity capable of delivering 
documents in a compatible form to allow documents to be filed. Walker Decl., ~ 5. 
(R. 169.) 
6. The Electronic Filing Manager is a computing application that receives and 
processes data submitted by service providers, and then passes information included in 
the data received to a court's "Document Management System." The Document 
Management System receives, manages, stores, and retrieves documents that are 
electronically filed with the courts. Walker Decl., ~ 7. (R. 169.) 
7. As a courtesy to filers, the Electronic Filing Manager is programmed to 
automatically send a response to a service provider acknowledging whether a document 
electronically submitted to a court has been accepted or rejected. A service provider 
should then transmit whether a document electronically submitted to a court has been 
accepted or rejected by a court to a filer. A filer may, however, opt out of receiving these 
acceptance or rejection notices with their service provider. Walker Decl., ~ 8. (R. 168.) 
8. A clerk of court or other authorized personnel may access and review any 
document that is submitted to the Electronic Filing Manager through a computer 
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application called the "Clerk Review Interface." If a document is not automatically 
approved for docketing, a Technical Support Specialist or other authorized court 
personnel may manually reject or accept electronically submitted documents through 
Clerk Review Interface. Walker Dec!.,~ 10. (R. 168.) 
9. Data and other information electronically submitted to a court, in addition 
to being reviewable through the Clerk Review Interface, is also recorded and managed by 
the "Case Management System." The Case Management System ("CMS") manages 
information related to court cases including records, calendars, and finances. Walker 
Dec!.,~ 11. (R. 168.) 
10. Each submission to the eFiling System is assigned a Filer Identification 
Number ("FIN"). Walker Dec!.,~ 12. (R. 167.) 
11. On August 2, 2013, Mark T. Flickinger, the Marziales' attorney, provided 
his Service Provider with two submissions. The FINs assigned to these submissions are 
172227 and 172245. Walker Dec!.,~ 13. (R. 167.) 
12. The submission assigned FIN 172227 included a Civil Cover Sheet and a 
Complaint and occurred at 4:10:04 PM on August 2, 2013. These documents were 
automatically rejected by the CMS because the documents sought to be filed were for the 
Fourth District Court located in Spanish Fork City because that court does not accept 
claims for more than $20,000.00, and the submission failed to specifY the amount sought 
through the claim. These documents were automatically rejected by the eFiling System 
and Mr. Flickinger's service provider received this rejection notice from the EFM at 
4:10:49 PM on August 2, 2013. Walker Dec!.,~ 14. (R. 167.) 
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13. A screenshot of the rejection notification provided to Mr. Flickinger's 
service provider states "The CMS returned a 'failure' status during the validation step. 
The message from the CMS is: this court accepts only claims 20000 or less; you 
submitted 'unspecified."' Walker Dec!.,~ 15. (R. 167, 145.) 
14. Ten minutes after the documents submitted for filing with the Fourth 
District Court located in Spanish Fork City were rejected, Plaintiffs' attorney submitted a 
Civil Cover Sheet, Complaint, and a Notice of Undertaking and Motion for filing with 
Fourth District Court located in Provo. This submission was assigned FIN 172245 and 
was made at 4:20:08 PM on August 2, 2013. This submission was manually rejected 
through the Clerk Review Interface because a credit card error occurred, and the service 
provider received this rejection notice from the EFM on August 2, 2013 at 4:41:56 PM. 
The rejection notice submitted to Mr. Flickinger's service provider stated: "A credit card 
error has occurred; please resubmit filing with valid credit card information for fee 
payment. You may want to try re-entering the credit card information, or a different 
credit card, before resubmitting. thank you, tracyw@utcourts.gov 801-578-3850 ext 4." 
Walker Dec!.,~ 16. (R. 167-166.) 
15. The Marziales explained to the Court of Appeals that they submitted this 
second complaint for filing on August 2, 2013 in the Fourth District Court located in 
Provo because they had failed to file the required undertaking fee pursuant to Utah Code 
§ 630-7-502(2) with the district court located in Spanish Fork City. Opinion,~ 3, fn. 2. 
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16. The documents submitted with FINs 172227 and 172245, specifically a 
Civil Cover Sheet, Complaint, and Notice of Undertaking and Motion, were not accepted 
by the district court on August 2, 2013. Walker Dec!.,~ 18. (R. 166.) 
17. On September 10, 2013, 39 days after the papers submitted for filing had 
been rejected, the Marziales' complaint was electronically filed with the trial court. 
Court Docket, R. 23; Affidavit ofBobbi Convery,~~ 4-5, 20-21. (R. 69, 67); Summary 
Judgment and Order. (R. 332C.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the Marziales' complaint was filed on 
August 2, 2013 and within the applicable statute of limitations. According to the Court 
of Appeals, a complaint (or other paper) only needs to be received by the electronic filing 
system, court clerk, or a judge for it to be considered filed. Utah law, however, clearly 
provides that more than just receipt of a paper is required for filing. 
This Court has held that the legislature may generally prescribe the methods or 
means by which the jurisdiction of the courts may be invoked in the absence of 
constitutional inhibition. The legislature has mandated the payment of a filing fee for a 
complaint to be accepted by and filed with a district court. 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals also sets forth a definition of "accept" 
utilized by Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that is incompatible with the text 
and structure of other rules and puts the responsibility of ensuring proper filing of papers 
on the judiciary rather than litigants. 
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Finally, while the Court of Appeals did not address the filing status of the 
Marziales' complaint with the Fourth District Court in Spanish Fork City, the record on 
appeal shows that the Marziales failed to submit an "undertaking," a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to filing an action under the Governmental Immunity Act. Further, even if 
this Court does address the filing status of the Marziales' complaint with Fourth District 
Court in Spanish Fork City, it should affirm that that the district court appropriately 
rejected that complaint through its case management system, which is required to be 
implemented by Utah statute. 
ARGUMENT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because it incorrectly 
applies Rules 3 and 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and statutes requiring clerks to 
be paid filing fees to accept a complaint. The Court of Appeals, citing the decision of 
Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ~~ 13-16,29 P.3d 1225, held: 
As our supreme court explained in Dipoma, rule 3 'contains 
no express reference to filing fees as a jurisdictional 
requirement,' and '[c]ertainly, if it had been intended that 
payment of filing fees be a jurisdictional requirement for 
commencing an action, a provision expressly requiring that 
fees be paid in advance would have been included.' After 
Dipoma, rule 3 was amended to make this principle explicit: 
'Dishonor of a check or other form of payment does not affect 
the validity of the filing.' 
(citations omitted). The Court of Appeals further held that "rule 5 defines filing as the 
'earliest of acceptance by the electronic filing system, the clerk of court, or the judge" 
and "[w)e conclude that the complaint's electronic receipt was the meaningful equivalent 
of its acceptance." !d. at~ 17 (defining the term "accept" by utilizing Merriam-Webster 
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Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accept [https://perma.cc/YWSW-
DVWH]). Finally, the Court of Appeals held that "nothing in the rules permits a court 
clerk to reject a filing for lack of payment." !d. at '1[9 (citations omitted). 
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. First, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals does not properly consider Utah constitutional provisions related to the 
jurisdiction of district courts, the 2008 amendment to Utah R. Civ. P. 5(e), and Utah 
statutes setting forth the duties of clerks of court to collect filing fees. Second, this case 
is factually and legally distinguishable from Dipoma, making that decision inapplicable 
to this case. Third, the decision of the Court of Appeals utilizes a definition of "accept" 
that is incompatible with the text and structure of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
puts the onus of ensuring that papers are properly filed on the judiciary rather than 
litigants. Last, this Court should refuse to consider the filing status of the Marziales' 
complaint with the Fourth District Court in Spanish Fork City because the record on 
appeal makes clear that the Marziales failed to submit an "undertaking," a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to filing an action under the Governmental Immunity Act. Alternatively, if 
this Court does address the filing status of the Marziales' complaint with Fourth District 
Court in Spanish Fork City, it should affirm that that complaint was appropriately 
rejected by the Fourth District Court's case management system and, therefore, was never 
filed. 
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I. A FILING FEE MUST BE PAID FOR A COMPLAINT TO BE ACCEPTED 
BY THE ELECTRONIC FILING SYSTEM OR COURT CLERK. 
Utah law provides that the "district court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all 
extraordinary writs." Utah Canst., Art. VIII, Sec. 5; See also, Utah Code§ 78A-5-
I 02(1) ("The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law"). In State v. Johnson, 114 
P .2d 1034, 1040 (Utah 1941 ), this Court held: 
A power to constitute courts is power to prescribe its powers 
and the mode of trial, and consequently if nothing is said in 
the Constitution to the contrary, the legislature would be at 
liberty to prescribe what cases should be tried therein .... The 
legislature may generally prescribe the methods or means by 
which the jurisdiction of the courts may be invoked in the 
absence of constitutional inhibitions ... 
The Utah legislature is, therefore, authorized to impose requirements for the jurisdiction 
of district courts to be invoked. Further, Rule 1(a) sets forth the scope of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and provides: "These rules govern the procedure in the courts ofthe 
state of Utah in all actions of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in 
all statutory proceedings, excepts as governed by other rules promulgated by the court or 
statutes enacted by the Legislature and except as provided in Rule 81." (Emphasis 
added). 
In this case, Utah Code§ 78A-2-301(1)(dd) directs that "[e]xcept as provided in 
this section, all fees shall be paid at the time the clerk accepts the pleading for filing or 
performs the requested service." An exception to the payment of filing fees prior to the 
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institution of any action is set forth in Utah Code § 78A-2-302(2), which provides "any 
person may institute, prosecute, defend, and appeal any cause in any court in this state 
without prepayment of fees and costs or security, by taking and subscribing, before any 
officer authorized to administer an oath, an affidavit of impecuniosity demonstrating 
financial inability to pay fees and costs or give security." Absent the submission of an 
affidavit of impecuniosity, the legislature has clearly mandated that private1 litigants shall 
pay filing fees as a precondition to a complaint being accepted by a court clerk. 
The versions of Rules 3 and 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to 
this case are consistent with the requirements of these filing fee statutes. With regard to 
when a district court obtains jurisdiction, Utah R. Civ. P. 3(b) provides that the "court 
shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing of the complaint or service of the summons 
and copy of the complaint." Rule 5(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (2013) sets 
forth the definition of "filing": 
Filing with the court defined. A party may file with the clerk 
of court using any means of delivery permitted by the court. 
The court may require parties to file electronically with an 
electronic filing account. Filing is complete upon the earliest 
of acceptance by the electronic filing system, the clerk of 
court or the judge. The filing date shall be noted on the 
paper. 
(emphasis added). This version of Rule 5(e) became effective pursuant to the 2008 
amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and requires that papers are only filed 
1 Filing fees may not be charged to the state, its agencies, or political subdivisions filing 
or defending any action. See Utah Code§ 78A-2-30l(l)(ee) 
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when they are "accepted," the precise word utilized by Utah Code§ 78A-2-301(l)(dd).2 
A complaint, therefore, cannot be accepted by a court clerk unless a filing fee is paid, and 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure make clear that a filing is not complete until is 
accepted by a court clerk, the electronic filing system, or a judge. In this case, the 
Marziales' complaint was not filed, i.e., accepted, on August 2, 2013 -the complaint 
submitted for filing that day was expressly rejected by the court clerk and the electronic 
filing system. The Marziales were required to submit a third complaint for filing on 
September 10,2013, which was accepted by the electronic filing system. This filing, as 
the district court correctly ruled, was untimely. 
II. THE DIPOMA DECISION IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THIS CASE. 
The Court of Appeals based its decision on this Court's ruling in Dipoma. The 
legal issues and facts with which the Dipoma Court was presented differ significantly 
from those of this case. The issue presented by this appeal is whether clerks of court or 
the electronic filing system managed by the clerks of court must accept a complaint even 
when a filing fee is not paid. Dipoma, on the other hand, dealt with the issue of whether 
a complaint is properly filed when it is accepted with a filing fee that is subsequently 
dishonored. Dipoma, at~~ 2, 3.3 In Dipoma, the clerk of court "accepted Dipoma's 
check and stamped her complaint 'filed."' 2001 UT 61, ~ 2. Thus, because the clerk had 
2 The current version of Rule 5 still provides that "[f]iling is complete upon the earliest 
acceptance by the electronic filing system, the clerk of court or the judge." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 5(e) (2016). 
3 The Dipoma decision was made prior to the electronic filing system being instituted and 
was at a time when it was more common for practitioners to pay filing fees by check. 
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already filed the complaint, the relative duties of clerks of court to accept a complaint 
without payment of the filing fee were not reviewed. Dipoma simply involved a motion 
for summary judgment in which the defendant argued that even though the complaint had 
been accepted and was stamped as having been filed within the statute of limitations, it 
nonetheless should not have been considered filed because the filing fee had not been 
paid. !d. ~ 4. Citing the parties' "reasonable reliance" on the acceptance of a pleading, 
the Dipoma Court held that "payment of filing fees is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for 
the commencement of an action under rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." !d. 
at~ 15. 
The Marziales argue in this case that their complaint should be construed to have 
been filed on August 2, 2013 and within the statute oflimitations even though it was 
never accepted by the electronic filing system. (R. 37, 40.) However, the Marziales' 
complaint was expressly rejected consistent with Utah law requiring that a filing fee be 
paid at the time at which a clerk accepts a pleading or a judge on that date. (R. 167-166); 
see also, Utah Code§ 78A-2-301(1)(dd). In this case, and in contrast to the issues 
reviewed in Dipoma, the basis of the City's motion for summary judgment was that the 
district court did not have jurisdiction over the Marziales' claim until a complaint was 
filed, which, under Rule 5, required it to be accepted by the clerk of court, electronic 
filing system, or judge. Here, the statute of limitations had run by the time the Marziales' 
complaint was actually filed. 
The Dipoma Court also did not review versions of Rules 3 and 5 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure applicable to this case. Implicit in the decision of the Court of 
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Appeals is that Rule 3 was amended to account for the Dipoma holding. See, Opinion, 
~ 13. However, the opinion of Court of Appeals does not account for the 2008 
amendment to Rule 5( e) in the context of statutes and issues presented to the Dipoma 
Court. The Dipoma Court confirmed that "filing" was defined by Rule 5, which stated, in 
pertinent part at that time, that "the filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as 
required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court." 2001 
UT 61, ~ 10. The version of Rule 5 reviewed in the Dipoma decision, therefore, did not 
specifically define "filing" to require that papers be "accepted" by a clerk of court. As 
shown above, the version of Rule 5(e) applicable to this case (and still in effect) requires 
that papers be "accepted," the precise word utilized by Utah Code§ 78A-2-301(l)(dd), to 
be considered filed. To reach its decision, the Court of Appeals utilized the Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary to conclude that "the complaint's electronic receipt was the 
meaningful equivalent of its acceptance." Opinion,~ 17. As explained below, an 
analysis of the text and structure of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shows that the 
definition of "accept" used by the Court of Appeals is incorrect. 
III. THE DEFINITION OF "ACCEPT" USED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT AND STRUCTURE OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND ALSO SHIFTS THE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF ENSURING THAT PAPERS ARE PROPERLY 
FILED TO THE JUDICIARY. 
Statutes and rules are to be interpreted according to their plain meaning and courts 
do not look beyond that plain meaning unless an ambiguity exists. Dahl v. Harrison, 
2011 UT App 389, ~ 32, 265 P.3d 139. "The plain language of a statute is to be read as a 
whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute 
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and with other statutes under the same and related chapters." Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 
19, ~ 17, 5 P.3d 616 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A term is ambiguous 
when its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after a plain 
language analysis has been conducted. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 
UT 50,~ 15, 267 P.3d 863. 
The plain language of the term "acceptance" in Rule 5( e) connotes the authority to 
reject, or not retain, a document. See Black's Law Dictionary, 61h ed. (defining "accept" 
as "[t]o receive with approval or satisfaction; to receive with intent to retain ... Means 
something more than to receive, meaning to adopt, agree to carry out provisions, to keep 
and maintain ... ) (citations omitted) [Add. C]. Yet, the Court of Appeals held that the 
mere receipt of the Marziales' complaint by the electronic filing system was the 
"meaningful equivalent" of its acceptance. Opinion,~ 17 (citing the Merriam-Webster 
Online dictionary, which defines the term "accept" as "to receive or take (something 
offered); to take (something) as payment; to be able or designed to take or hold 
(something)"). This Court, in Craig v. Provo City, 2016 UT 40, ~ 26, fn. 3, recently 
noted that "as with many problems of statutory interpretation, dictionaries just don't 
answer the question. Instead they highlight the ambiguity -by including definitions 
encompassing both parties' positions." 4 Craig further clarifies that "ambiguities are 
4 The Marziales argued in their opening brief before the Utah Court of Appeals that the 
term "acceptance" should be defined by using the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. See 
Brief of Appellants, filed April10, 2015, p. 17. 
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often resolved by the text and structure of the statute." 2016 UT 40, ,; 26, fn. 3 (citing 
Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10,,; 13, 248 P.3d 465). 
The text and structure of Rule 5(e) and other Rules of Civil Procedure 
demonstrates that the term "acceptance" as used in Rule 5( e) implicates some form of 
consent to receive or intention to retain a paper submitted for filing. This Court5 uses the 
term "receive" throughout the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and yet that term is not used 
in Rule 5(e). For example, Rule 26(b)(8)(B) provides: 
If a party produces information that the party claims is 
privileged or prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, 
the producing party may notifY any receiving party of the 
claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a receiving 
party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified 
information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose 
the information until the claim is resolved ... 
(emphasis added). Similarly, Rule 65A( d) provides that a restraining order "is binding 
only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and 
attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who 
receive notice, in person or through counsel, or otherwise, of the order." (emphasis 
added). Consistent with other provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the term 
"receive" would have been utilized if only receipt of a paper by the electronic filing 
system, clerk of court, or judge was all that is required for a filing to be considered 
perfected. The fact that the term "receive" is not used in Rule 5( e) indicates that 
something more than mere receipt of a paper is required for filing to be perfected. 
5 Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution requires that the Utah Supreme Court to 
"adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state ... " 
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Further, the definition of "accept" utilized by the Court of Appeals is inconsistent 
with how that same term is utilized by Rule 10(t) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 10(t) provides that "[t]he clerk of the court may examine the pleadings and other 
papers filed with the court. If they are not prepared in conformity with paragraphs (a)-
(e), the clerk must accept the filing but may require counsel to substitute properly 
prepared papers for nonconforming papers ... " Here, the Rules of Civil Procedure make 
it clear that court clerks are required to accept papers for filing even when the format 
provisions of Rule 10 are not followed. Thus, court clerks are required to "accept," and 
therefore file, nonconforming papers under Rule 10. Rule 5(e), however, does not 
contain any language requiring court clerks, the electronic filing system, or judges to 
accept all papers received. The term "acceptance" in Rule 5( e), construed harmoniously 
with the other provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, means something more 
than receipt of a paper is required for a filing to be completed. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals' ruling puts the onus on ensuring proper filing with a 
district court on the judiciary. As an obvious matter, the responsibility to timely file a 
case is upon a claimant. See, e.g., Stevens v. Saunders, 220 S.E.2d 887, 892 (W.Va. 
1975) (" .. .it is a well-established rule that the plaintiff or his attorney bears the 
responsibility to see that an action is properly instituted ... "). The Court of Appeals has 
also recently emphasized that an expectation of diligence exists on behalf of parties and 
that parties remain obligated to monitor a court's docket. See Aghdasi v. Saberin, 2015 
UT App 73, ~~ 7-8, 347 P.3d 427. In this case, the Marziales' attorney attempted to file a 
complaint twice on August 2, 2013, both complaints were rejected, and then 39 days 
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elapsed before any inquiry was made about whether the Marziales' complaint was 
actually filed. Rather than keeping the responsibility of making sure that an action is 
properly instituted with a claimant, the opinion of the Court of Appeals allows for 
circumstances where the mere electronic transmission of information, regardless of how 
that information is processed, or the simple handing of papers to a judge, constitutes 
filing of a paper. As shown above, however, the responsibility of making sure documents 
are properly and timely processed so as to allow a claimant to proceed with a case should 
be on a claimant and not on the judiciary. 
IV. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION CANNOT EXIST OVER THE 
COMPLAINT SOUGHT TO BE FILED WITH THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
COURT LOCATED IN SPANISH FORK CITY AND, EVEN IF 
JURISDICTION COULD BE INVOKED, THE DISTRICT COURT 
CORRECTLY RULED THAT THAT COMPLAINT WAS NEVER FILED. 
The Court of Appeals expressly did not rule on whether the complaint submitted 
for filing in the district court located in Spanish Fork City was properly filed. This Court 
should hold that jurisdiction cannot exist over that complaint or, alternatively, should 
affirm the ruling of the district court. The record on appeal makes clear that the 
Marziales failed to submit an undertaking required by Utah Code § 63G-7 -60 I (2) with its 
complaint sought to be filed with the Fourth District Court located in Spanish Fork City. 
Opinion,~ 3, fn. 2. The GIA, through section 63G-7-601(2), requires that "[a]t the time 
the action is filed, the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court that is: 
(a) not less than $300; and (b) conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of the taxable 
costs incurred by the governmental entity in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute 
the action or fails to recover judgment." The GIA demands strict compliance with its 
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requirements to allow suit against governmental entities. Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 
UT 16, ~ 13,440 P.3d 632. In Craig, 2016 UT 40, ~~ 17-18, this Court affirmed the 
dismissal of a claim against a governmental entity when the required undertaking was not 
paid and further held that the that the GIA forecloses the applicability of Utah's Savings 
Statute, Utah Code § 78B-2-lll. Subject matter jurisdiction in this case cannot exist for 
the Marziales' complaint sought to be filed with the district court in Spanish Fork City 
because no undertaking was filed and the Savings Statute does not allow for the refiling 
ofthe complaint within the applicable statute of limitations. Consequently, this Court 
should not consider the filing status of the Marziales' complaint sought to be filed with 
the court located in Spanish Fork City. See Brown v. Division of Water Rights, 2010 UT 
14, ~ 13, 228 P.3d 747 (Holding that challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be 
raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal). 
Even assuming that the court's jurisdiction could be invoked for the Marziales' 
complaint sought to be filed with the district court located in Spanish Fork City, Utah law 
clearly requires district courts to create a case management system to "ensure judicial 
accountability for the just and timely disposition of cases" and to "provide for each judge 
a full judicial work load that accommodates differences in the subject matter or 
complexity of cases assigned to different judges." Utah Code § 78A-5-103(2). In this 
case, the Marziales complaint sought to be filed in Spanish Fork City was automatically 
rejected by the case management system implemented by the Fourth District Court. 
Walker Dec!.,~ 14, R. 167. As shown above, the legislature may generally prescribe the 
methods or means by which the jurisdiction of the courts may be invoked in the absence 
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of constitutional inhibitions, and the Marziales' complaint sought to be filed with the 
district court located in Spanish Fork City was rejected pursuant to the mandates set forth 
in Utah Code§ 78A-5-103(2). Consequently, the ruling of the district court that the 
Marziales' complaint was not filed with the district court located in Spanish Fork City 
should, if necessary, be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the City respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and affirm the district court's determination that 
the Marziales' complaint was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J"J"/1\ day ofDecember, 2016. 
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STEPHEN L. ROTH and SENIOR }UDGE PAMELA T. GREENWOOD 
concurred. 1 
TOOMEY, Judge: 
'[1 In this appeal, we must determine whether the district 
court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Spanish 
Fork City (the City) based upon Carole and James Marziales' 
(Plaintiffs) failure to timely file their complaint. Because we 
determine that the complaint was filed within the period 
prescribed by the statute of limitations under the Governmental 
Immunity Act of Utah, we reverse. 
1. Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat by special assignment 
as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-
201(6). 
Marziale v. Spanish Fork City 
BACKGROUND 
'[2 Carole Marziale fell at the Spanish Fork City Sports 
Complex on July 11, 2011. She and her husband, James Marziale, 
filed a notice of claim against the City alleging injuries caused by 
the fall. The notice of claim went unanswered, and as a 
consequence, was deemed denied on September 7, 2012, thereby 
opening the door for Plaintiffs to file a civil action against the 
City. 
'[3 On August 2, 2013, an employee of Plaintiffs' counsel 
(Employee) electronically transmitted to counsel's electronic 
filing service provider' two nearly identical complaints against 
the City to be electronically filed 3 with the court. Employee first 
submitted a complaint without the required undertaking' in the 
Spanish Fork department of the Fourth Judicial District. The 
2. An electronic filing service provider is a vendor outside the 
court "capable of delivering Legal XML compliant electronic 
filings. Vendors will provide an interface to their customer ... to 
file electronic documents with a court." Utah State Courts, 
Utah Trial Court System Electronic Filing Guide, at v (Dec. 2013), 
http://www. u tcourts.gov I efiling/ docs/ electronic_ filing_guide. pdf 
[http://perma.cc/N2ED-H48X]. 
3. "An Electronic Filing or eFiling is an electronic document 
delivered to a court by electronic means." Id. "(P]leadings and 
other papers filed in civil cases in the district court on or after 
April 1, 2013 shall be electronically filed using the electronic 
filer's interface." Utah R Jud. Admin. 4-503(1). 
4. An undertaking in this context is a promise to pay "taxable 
costs incurred by the governmental entity in the action if the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to recover 
judgment." Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-7-502(2) (LexisNexis 2011). 
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complaint alleged damages for negligence and loss of 
consortium, and its first page included the words "Tier III" 
under the caption "Complaint." 5 Approximately ten minutes 
later, Employee submitted the same complaint, with the 
required notice of undertaking, to the Provo department of the 
Fourth Judicial District. The service provider transmitted both 
complaints to the courts. 
'1[4 On September 10, Employee used Xchange6 to locate the 
filed complaints. Unable to find either complaint in Xchange, 
Employee contacted the administrator for the Fourth District 
Court and learned that although the documents had been 
transmitted to the court, both had been rejected. 
'1[5 Employee requested that the court provide her with 
images of the display on a computer screen, or "screenshots," 
showing the filing status for each of the complaints. The 
screenshots of the eFiling portal confirmed that both the Spanish 
Fork and Provo complaints were transmitted to the courts on 
August 2, 2013; the complaints were also rejected that day. The 
Spanish Fork complaint was rejected because "[the Spanish 
Fork] court accepts only claims [$]20000 or less; you submitted 
'unspecified."' The Provo complaint was rejected because of a 
"credit card error." A different screenshot of the administrator's 
5. Rule 26 sets limits on fact discovery that correlate with the 
amount of damages being sought. See Utah R. Civ. Pro. 26(c)(5). 
A Tier III case is one in which the claimed damages are $300,000 
or more. !d. 
6. X change is "[a] subscription service that allows individuals to 
use the Internet to search and access case information filed in 
Utah's district and justice courts" to look up Plaintiffs' case. Utah 
State Courts, Utah Trial Court System Electronic Filing Guide, at 
v (Dec. 2013), http://www.utcourts.gov/efiling/docs/electronic_ 
filing_guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/N2ED-H48X]. 
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system for the Provo complaint shows the word "Approved" 
under the words "Status History," but its status, which was "set 
by Administrator," was changed to "Invalid." Upon discovering 
that the Provo complaint was rejected due to a problem with the 
payment of the filing fee, Employee immediately re-submitted 
the complaint to the Provo department with proper payment. 
'1[6 The administrator explained in an affidavit that, although 
the court received the service provider's transmissions of 
Plaintiffs' documents, the Spanish Fork complaint was 
automatically rejected because that department does not accept 
claims exceeding $20,000. The administrator also explained that 
she manually rejected the Provo complaint and notice of 
undertaking because "[a] credit card error has occurred." 
Because she rejected them, the administrator concluded that 
Plaintiffs' complaint and notice of undertaking "were not 
accepted by the Court on August 2, 2013." 
'1[7 Notice of the rejections was transmitted to Plaintiffs' 
service provider on August 2, 2013. There is no evidence in the 
court's records or in the administrator's affidavit that Plaintiffs' 
counsel received notice of the rejection, and Plaintiffs' counsel 
and Employee each attested that they did not receive notice of 
the rejections from the service provider. 
'l[S In December 2013, the City moved for summary judgment 
on the ground that Plaintiffs' civil action was barred because it 
was filed after the period specified in the applicable statute of 
limitations under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. Utah 
Code section 63G-7-403(2)(b) requires that "a claimant shall 
begin the action within one year after the denial of the claim." 
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-7-403(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2011). Thus, to be 
timely, the action needed to be filed no later than September 6, 
2013. See id. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and filed a separate 
motion, asking the court to declare that their complaint was filed 
August 2, 2013. The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion and 
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determined that because the complaints were transmitted on 
August 2, 2013, but not accepted, they were not instituted within 
the period specified by the statute of limitations. See id. The court 
reasoned that because the complaints were not timely filed, it 
had no subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims, and it 
therefore granted the City's motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs appeal. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
'1[9 At issue is whether Plaintiffs timely filed their complaint. 
In reviewing a district court's decision to grant summary 
judgment, we consider "the facts and any reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing 
party," "giving no deference to [the district court's] conclusions 
of law." Flowell Elec. Ass'n., Inc. v. Rhodes Pump, LLC, 2015 UT 87, 
'![ 8, 361 P.3d 91. Further, "[t]he application of [a] statute of 
limitations is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness." Ottens v. McNeil, 2010 UT App 237, '![ 20, 239 P.3d 
308. 
ANALYSIS 
'1[10 On appeal, Plaintiffs argue they timely filed their 
complaint in both Provo and Spanish Fork. Specifically, Plaintiffs 
argue the Provo complaint was erroneously rejected for 
problems with payment. They also argue that the Spanish Fork 
complaint was erroneously rejected because there was no 
indication the Spanish Fork department of the Fourth Judicial 
District is "limited in scope or jurisdiction," and there was "no 
basis in law for rejecting" their complaint. Finally, Plaintiffs 
argue that even if the complaint was validly rejected, the court 
failed to give notice of the rejection which violated Plaintiffs' 
constitutional due process rights. Because we determine that the 
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Provo complaint was timely filed, we do not address Plaintiffs' 
remaining arguments. 
'![11 Plaintiffs contend the Provo complaint and notice of 
undertaking were filed on August 2, 2013 when counsel's service 
provider transmitted these documents to the court and the court 
received and "approved" them. Plaintiffs' argument requires us 
to determine whether the district court erred in concluding that 
Plaintiffs did not file their action within the statutory one-year 
period. If the action was filed August 2, 2013, the date Plaintiffs' 
complaint was initially electronically transmitted to the district 
court, it was filed in time; if it was filed September 10, the date 
the complaint was again transmitted, it was not. 
'![12 Plaintiffs rely on rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which provides that "[f]iling is complete upon the 
earliest of acceptance by the electronic filing system, the clerk of 
court or the judge." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(e). We therefore consider 
whether the administrator's rejection of a complaint because "[a] 
credit card error has occurred" means that the complaint was not 
filed for purposes of preserving a claim under that statute of 
limitations. Plaintiffs argue that neither the eFiling system nor 
the administrator can reject a complaint because of a problem 
with payment. We agree. 
'![13 Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifies that 
civil actions are commenced "by filing a complaint with the 
court." See id. 3(a). 7 By statute, the court must collect filing fees, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-301 (LexisNexis 2012), but the 
payment and collection of the filing fee is not a requirement for 
filing an action, see Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, '!['![ 13-16, 29 
P.3d 1225. As our supreme court explained in Dipoma, rule 3 
7. The rule provides alternate means of commencing an action 
but it is not relevant to this case. 
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"contains no express reference to filing fees as a jurisdictional 
requirement," and "[c]ertainly, if it had been intended that 
payment of filing fees be a jurisdictional requirement for 
commencing an action, a provision expressly requiring that fees 
be paid in advance would have been included." Id. '[ 13. After 
Dipoma, rule 3 was amended to make this principle explicit: 
"Dishonor of a check or other form of payment does not affect 
the validity of the filing." Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a). 
1[14 In this case, the administrator rejected the Provo 
complaint and notice of undertaking due to a "credit card error." 
This is equivalent to the dishonor of a form of payment, and as 
the rule provides, it did not affect the validity of the filing. See 
id.; see also Dipoma, 2001 UT 61, '[ 16. 
'[15 The City counters that another rule of civil procedure 
requires that a complaint "be accepted not merely received." 
(Citing Utah R. Civ. P. 5(e) ("Filing is complete upon the earliest 
of acceptance by the electronic filing system, the clerk of court or 
the judge.").) As the City sees it, "Utah law mandates that a 
filing fee is to be paid for a complaint to be accepted," and the 
complaint's rejection "did not conflict with the provlSlons of 
Rule 3," which "do not apply until after a complaint is 
accepted." We are not persuaded. 
'[16 Rule 5(e) specifies that 
[a] party may file with the clerk of court using any 
means of delivery permitted by the court. The 
court may require parties to file electronically with 
an electronic filing account. Filing is complete 
upon the earliest of acceptance by the electronic 
filing system, the clerk of court or the judge. 
The rule does not expressly require a filing fee as a prerequisite 
to "acceptance." Thus, the City's argument impermissibly reads 
additional language into the rule. Moreover, it conflicts with the 
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reasoning that our supreme court articulated in Dipoma: "[I]f it 
had been intended that payment of filing fees be a jurisdictional 
requirement for commencing an action, a provision expressly 
requiring that fees be paid in advance would have been 
included." 2001 UT 61, 'j[ 13. 
'j[17 Rather, rule 5 defines filing as the "earliest of acceptance by 
the electronic filing system, the clerk of court or the judge." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 5(e). In this case, the record establishes that the earliest 
event was an electronic transmission received by the electronic 
filing system. We conclude that the complaint's electronic receipt 
was the meaningful equivalent of its acceptance. 8 See Accept, 
Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/accept [https:// perma.cc/YWSW-DVWH]. 
'l[18 Further, rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that "[i]f a check or other form of payment tendered as 
a filing fee is dishonored, the party shall pay the fee by cash or 
cashier's check within 10 days after notification by the court." 
Although the system administrator notified the service provider 
that there was a problem with the credit card payment, neither 
the system administrator nor the service provider directly 
8. We note that the Utah Trial Court System Electronic 
Filing Guide, prepared by the Administrative Office of the 
Courts, explains that "[a]ll documents are accepted and filed by 
the court when they are received." Utah State Courts, Utah 
Trial Court System Electronic Filing Guide, 2 (Dec. 2013), 
http://www. u tcourts. gov I efiling/ docs/ electronic_ filing_guide. pdf 
[http://perma.cc/N2ED-H48X]. It acknowledges that "[e]lectronic 
filing is subject to the rules of the Utah Judicial Council and the 
Utah Supreme Court," and "[i]n the event of a conflict between 
the electronic filing system requirements and the rules of the 
Judicial Council or the Utah Supreme Court, the rules of the 
council or court will prevail." I d. 
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notified Plaintiffs. Instead, Employee discovered the problem by 
contacting the court on September 10, and payment was 
immediately made at that time. And while "[ d]ishonor of a 
check or other form of payment . . . may be grounds for such 
sanctions as the court deems appropriate, which may include 
dismissal of the action and the award of costs and attorney fees," 
nothing in the rules permits a court clerk to reject a filing for lack 
of payment. Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a); see also Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 
UT 61, '!['![ 13-16, 29 P.3d 1225. We thus determine the Provo 
complaint was timely filed. 
CONCLUSION 
'1[19 We conclude that the Provo complaint was filed on 
August 2, 2013, and was thus within the period provided by the 
statute of limitations applicable to actions brought under the 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. We therefore reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City 
and remand this case for further proceedings. 
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The Order of Court is led below: 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 




SPANISH FORK CITY, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 130401364 
Judge Darold J. McDade 
On Tuesday, July I, 2014, at 9:00a.m., following briefing by the parties, the Court, the 
Honorable Darold J. McDade presiding, heard oral argument on (I) the Motion for Summary 
Judgment of Defendant Spanish Fork City (the "City"); (2) the Motion to Correct Record filed 
by the Plaintiffs; (3) Motion to Strike Declaration of Tracy Walker filed by the Plaintiffs; 
( 4) Motion to Strike Affidavit of Mark T. Flickinger filed by the City; and (5) Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of Bobbi Convery filed by the City. Plaintiffs Carole Marziale and James Marziale 
were represented by Mark T. Flickinger of Flickinger & Sutterfield, P.C. The City was 
represented by John M. Zidow of Williams & Hunt. 
The Court entertained extensive argument from counsel and reviewed the various 
memoranda and other documents filed by the parties. After hearing and carefully considering 
the arguments of counsel and the legal issues to be addressed, the Court finds as a matter of law 
that the Plaintiffs' Complaint was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations set forth 
by Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403(2)(b ). Rule 5(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a "(f]iling is complete upon the earliest of acceptance by the electronic filing system, the 
clerk of court or the judge." Plaintiffs' counsel submitted a Complaint for filing through the 
electronic filing system twice on August 2, 2013. These submitted Complaints were not 
accepted by the electronic filing system, the clerk of court, or a judge as required by Rule 5(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore were not filed with the Court. 39 days later, on 
September 10,2013, Plaintiffs' counsel again submitted the Complaint to the electronic filing 
system, at which time the Complaint was accepted and, therefore, filed. However, the filing of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint on September 10,2013 was not within the applicable statute of! imitation 
set forth by Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-7-403(2)(b). Because strict compliance with the filing 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah is jurisdictional, Plaintiffs' failure to 
file a legal action within one year of their Notice of Claim being denied by the City deprives the 
Com1 of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims and the City is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. 
2 
Because the Court finds as a matter of law that the Plaintiffs' Complaint was not filed 
within the applicable statute of limitations, there is no basis for Plaintiffs' Motion to Correct 
Record. Finally, rather than strike the Affidavit of Mark T. Flickinger, Affidavit of Bobbi 
Convery, or the Declaration of Tracy Walker, the Court considered them and all of the 
evidentiary objections related thereto. However, the Court finds no admissible evidence from 
the affidavits or declaration that creates an issue of fact that would preclude the legal conclusion 
that the filing of the Plaintiffs' legal action is untimely. 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED & DECREED that: 
l. The Motion for Summary Judgment of the City is granted, and the claims of 
Plaintiffs are dismissed with prejudice. The parties shall bear their respective costs and attorney 
fees related to this action; 
2. The Motion to Correct Record filed by the Plaintiffs is denied; 
3. The Motion to Strike Declaration of Tracy Walker filed by the Plaintiffs is 
denied; 
4. The Motion to Strike Affidavit of Mark T. Flickinger filed by the City is denied; 
and 
5. The Motion to Strike Affidavit ofBobbi Convery filed by the City is denied. 
[End of Document) 
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ACADEMY 
Academy. An institution of higher learning. An associ· 
ation of experts in some particulor bnmch of art, litera· 
ture, law, or science (e.g. American Academy of Matri-
monial Lawyers). In its original meuning, an associa-
tion formed for mutual improvement. or for the ad· 
vancement of science or urt: in latet use, a species of 
educational institution, of n level between the elementa.· 
ry school and the college. U.S. ex reL Jacovides v. Day, 
C.C.A.N.Y., 32 F.2d 042, 544; Sisters of Mercy v. Town 
of Hooksett, 9;! N.H. 301, 42 A.2d 222, 225. In current 
usage, tNm commonly refers to privn.te high school o1· 
one of the service ac.ademie.s (e, g. Air Forct:l Acad(.>my). 
Bee SchooL 
A c.elo usque ad centrum /&y .slylow flskwiy red 
sentr<)m/' From the heavens to the C{~nter (lf the earth, 
Or more fully, Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad crelum 
el ad inf'eros. The owner of the soil owns to the heavens 
and also to the lov>'est depths. Or, Cuju.l§ est solum est 
usque ad c~lurn,-the owner of the soil owns to the 
hetwens. This doctrine has, however, been abro~rated; 
the flig-ht of airplanes and oil and gas regulations have 
qualit1ed Lhe owner's dominion not only in the htmvens 
but in the lowest depths. 8ee Air rights. 
A cnncelltmdo /C.y ka-ns<>lilindow/. From cancelling. 3 
BLComm. 46. 
A cuncellis /f:y kU!nsebs/, The Chaneello1'. 
A cancenis <:.ut·ia:: e'tplodi /&y kxnsOI"s kyttriyiy 
eksp!Owday/. To be expelled from the bar of the court. 
Acapte /~kreptl. In French feudal luw, 11 species of 
rclil,Olf: a seignorial right due on every change of n 
tenant. A feudal right which formerly prevailed in 
Languedoc and Guyenne, being attached to that species 
of herituble estates which were granted on the contract 
of emphytcusi.o:.. 
A causa de cy /ey k6z.;. d;'l siy/ .. F'or t.his reuson. 
Accedas a.d curiam /reksiyd;>S red kyUriy;}m/. (Lut. 
Thnt you go to court) An orir;hml wdt out of chnneery 
directed to the sheriff, for the purpose of removing a 
replevin suit. from a Cottrt Banm or u hundrod court to 
one of the supet·ior courts of law. It directs the sheriff 
to go to the lower cottrt, and enroll t.he proceedings and 
send up the rl'cord. 3 Bl.Comm. 34. 
Accede. To conserd.; agree. 
Ac,celerated Gust Recovery System. (ACRS). An ac· 
count.ing method whereby the cost of a fhed asset is 
wdtten off for tax purpost.'s over a prescribed period of 
time. Instituted by the Economic Recove-ry 'I'ax Act of 
1981, and modified by Tax Reform Act vf 1986, the 
system plactlS assets into one of various recovery periods 
and prescribes t.he applicable percentag£> of cost that can 
bt• dedud;ed each year. LR.C. § 16ft See also Asset 
Depreciation Hange. 
Ac.~celerttt.ed doprecitltion. Various methods of depred-
:.J:.tion tht1t yield laq:.t'-~r deductions in tht~ earlier yf~nrs of 
the life of nn nsset than the straight-line method, Ex· 
amples includt~ th.:- double dedining~balance and the 
12 
sum of the years' digits methods of depreciation. See 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System; Depreciation. 
Acceleration. The shortening of the time for the vest-
ing in possession of un expectant interest. Hastm1ing of 
the enjoyment of ~:tn estate. which wa.s otherwise post~ 
poned to a later period. Blackwell v. Virginia Trust Co., 
177 Va. 299, 14 S.E.2d 301, 304. If t.he life estate fails 
for any reason the remainder is 11 accelerated''. Elliott v. 
Brintling<n·, 376 UJ, 147, 33 N.E.2d 199, 201. 
Doctrine of "acceleration", as applied to law of proper· 
ty, refers to hastening of owner of fut.ure interests 
toward status of present possession or enjoynlent by 
l'eilson of failure of preceding estate. Aberg v. First 
Nat. Bank in Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 450 S.W.2d 40:l, 408. 
A temedy used wh~we there has been an anticipatory 
repudiation or a possibility of a future breach. Rose 
City Transit Co. v. City of Potdand, 18 Or.App. 3691 525 
P.2d 1325, 1353. 
A<.~eeleration clause. A provision or clause in a mort-
gage, note, bond, d(-md of trusl, or other credit ag::roc-
mo-nt, that requires the maker, drawer or other obligor 
to pay part or all of the balance soonN' thun the dat.e m· 
dates spocified for payment upon the occurrence of some 
event. or circl1mstance described in the contract. Such 
clause operates when there ha& been a default such as 
nonpayment of pl'incipal, interest, or failure to pay 
insurance premiums. General Motm·s Accopt.anco Corp. 
v. Shuey, 243 Ky. 7>1, 47 S.W.2d 968. U.C.C. § 1-208 
provides that if the provision for ''~cceltwation is "at. will" 
such demand must be mnde only under a "good faith" 
belief that the prospect or payment is impaired. 
Acceleration of remainders. Hastening of owner of 
remainder J.nterest. in property toward status of pNsent 
possession or enjoyment, by reason of failure preceding 
estate. Aberg v. 'F'irst Nat'l Bunk in Dallas, 'l'ex.Civ. 
App., 450 S.W.2d 403, 408. 
Acceleration premium. Incl'l.'lttsed rate of pay for in· 
creased productioll. 
Acettpt. To receive with approval or satisfaction; to 
receive with intent to retain. Morris \', State, 102 Ark. 
513, 145 S.W. 213, 214. Admit and agt'ee to; accede to 
or c:on$ent to; receive with approval: adopt; agree to. 
Rocha v. Hulon, 6 Cai.App.2d 245, 44 P.2d 478, 482, 483. 
Means something more than to receive, meaning to 
adopt, to agree to catry out. provisions, lo keep and 
retain. 
In the capacity of drawee of a bill. means to recognize 
the draft., and engage to pay il when due. See Accept-
ance. 
Acceptance. The taking and receiving of anything in 
good part, and as it were tt tacit agreement to a preced-
ing act, which might have been defeated or avoided if 
such acceptunce had not been made. The act of a 
person to whom a thing is offered or tende1·ed by anoth· 
cr, whereby he receives the thing with the intention of 
n~taining it, such intention being evidenced by a suffi-
cient act. Aetna lnv. Corporation v. Chandlel' Land-
scape & Floral Co., 227 Mo.App. 17, 50 S.W.2d 195, 197. 
